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Public Service Announcements:
Out with Monotony and in with Diversity
By DON LIVELY*
News and public affairs programming is the primary vehicle
broadcasters use to carry out their obligation to provide fair
and adequate coverage of public issues.' Such programming,
however, is subject to restrictive time and resource constraints
and to the broadcasters' definition of newsworthiness. Subject
matter which falls short of the newsworthiness standard, or
which escapes a licensee's attention, still may be important to
the community and essential for serving the public right of
"suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other
ideas and experiences."2
Public service announcements (PSA's) are well-tailored to
fill that information gap. The Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) defines a PSA as:
[a]n announcement for which no charge is made and which
promotes programs, activities, or services of Federal, State or
local governments (e.g., recruiting, sales of bonds, etc.) or the
programs, activities or services of nonprofit organizations (e.g.,
UGF, Red Cross Blood Donations, etc.) and other announce-
ments regarded as serving community interests, excluding
time signals, routine weather announcements, and promo-
tional announcements. 3
The spot format nature of a PSA offers an attractive and effec-
tive medium for a message. Because of their brevity and
scheduling adaptability, PSA's tax neither the concentration of
the audience nor the profit objectives of the broadcaster. Infor-
mation that is conveyed in a PSA, therefore, can be served up
readily by a broadcaster and digested easily by a view or lis-
tener.
* Law clerk for Honorable Jim R. Carrigan, United States District Court, Denver,
Colorado (1979-1980); A.B., University of California, Berkeley; M.S., Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D., University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Broadcasters are required to provide adequate and fair coverage of public is-
sues. 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
2. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
3. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.112 n.4; 73.282 n.4; 73.582 n.3; 73.670 n.4.
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Despite the rich promise for addressing public issues, in-
cluding controversial ones, PSA programming has fallen short
of its potential, at least partially because of an FCC policy that
neither requires nor strongly encourages PSA's for such pur-
poses.' Licensees are vested with broad discretion in deter-
mining the quantity and quality of the PSA's they choose to
air.' As a result, PSA's have become defined by both policy
and practice as messages that represent a limited range of in-
terests and that address, for the most part, non-controversial
matters. This disappointing performance has failed to comport
with the First Amendment values of "uninhibited, robust and
wide open debate"' and diversity in the electronic forum.'
Nevertheless, a basic premise of modern broadcasting is still
that "[i] t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right
of the broadcasters which is paramount."' That general princi-
ple, enunciated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,' fur-
nishes a springboard for fashioning a policy to broaden the
nature and enhance the use of PSA's.
I
The Problem with PSA's
Although PSA's have the potential of contributing signifi-
cantly to broadcast diversity, they are now mostly effective in
communicating a limited range of messages from a limited
4. The FCC's only inducement for PSA programming is to give ascertainment
programming credit to any PSA addressing a licensee's ascertained problems, needs,
and interests. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57
F.C.C.2d 418, 445, 35 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1555 (1975).
Licensees are required to list annually 10 problems they have ascertained in their
communities. At license renewal time, the FCC measures the extent of programming
toward those ascertained needs. Id. at 419, 35 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) at 1555.
5. The Commission has concluded that because of the licensee's knowledge of
the community, and because of the risk of "an inappropriate intrusion into the sensi-
tive area of programming," a broadcaster must have broad discretion in "the schedul-
ing and selection of PSA's." In re Petition to Institute a Notice of Inquiry and
Proposed Rulemaking on the Airing of Public Service Announcements by Broadcast
Licensees, 67 F.C.C.2d 907, 910 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PSA Petition].
The FCC has since decided to proceed with a general inquiry into PSA programming
and practices that could lead to a change in the agency's position. Airing Public Serv-
ice Announcements by Broadcast Licensees, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,725 (Aug. 24, 1978).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 389.
8. Id. at 390.
9. Id. at 395.
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range of sources. The present condition of PSA programming
is largely a product of limited access and fairness obstacles.
Television stations in a five-state area informed the FCC that
they planned to carry an average of 113 PSA's per week for the
1977-1980 license period."o Only about 40 percent of those
messages, however, were to be on behalf of organizations in
the stations' service areas."
A major criticism of PSA programming is that it is domi-
nated by two information sources: government agencies and
non-profit organizations. 2 The FCC's present definition of
PSA's may work in favor of such institutions, since they are the
only interests specifically singled out as appropriate PSA
sources.'3 In the recent past, however, the Commission re-
jected any modification of the formulation. The agency con-
cluded that the definition only explained the nature of PSA's
and afforded no special treatment for any particular group.1 4
Nonetheless, the FCC has since launched an inquiry into PSA
programming and practices to consider, among other matters,
the possible need for a revised PSA definition that would elimi-
nate any built-in preferences."
Aside from the possible favoritism government agencies and
non-profit organizations enjoy, such institutions are catered to
by a placement service with the know-how, experience and
connections to place messages effectively. The Advertising
Council has achieved recognition from its clients and critics as
the dominant broker between the government agencies and
nonprofit groups that have something to say, and the broad-
casters who can give the time and place to say it.16
The Council is composed of 85 representatives from major
corporations and media concerns." Tax-exempt groups and
government agencies are invited to submit proposals for PSA
campaigns to the Council. If a proposal is accepted, the Coun-
cil formulates the content of the message and handles the pro-
10. PSA Petition, supra note 5, at 913.
11. Id.
12. See PSA Petition, supra note 5, at 909 n.6.
13. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.112 n.4; 73.282 n.4; 73.582 n.3; 73.670 n.4.
14. PSA Petition, supra note 5, at 910.
15. Airing of Public Service Announcements by Broadcast Licensees, 43 Fed. Reg.
37,725 (Aug. 24, 1978).
16. See id. at 37,726, para. 8, n.10; PSA Petition, supra note 5, at 908 n.3.
17. Baldwin, Ad Council Prescription: Public Service Pablum, WASH. JOURNALISM
REV. 37 (Oct. 1977).
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ject from conception to distribution."
Production quality of Council spots is of the highest order,
since the nation's elite advertising agencies perform most of
the work. However, production cost is also of the highest or-
der." Many citizens and public service groups contend that, as
a result, they are simply priced out of the PSA market.2 0
The Council, in addition, has been criticized for an "estab-
lishmentarian" composition and for a narrow political and eco-
nomic philosophy that produces self-serving and non-
controversial PSA's. Charges have also been leveled that the
Council disdains efforts by citizens' groups to secure its en-
dorsement. 2 1 Allegations that the Council exercises inordinate
influence over the content and selection of PSA's have
prompted the FCC in its inquiry into PSA programming and
practices to investigate the Council's particular role.22
Any dominance or parochialism on the Council's part, how-
ever, is reinforced by the insistence of broadcasters that PSA's
"should deal affirmatively with the causes they advertise, as
opposed to those that attack or demean."23 Despite criticism of
the Council for its dominance in the PSA marketplace, the
Council seems to have reached its preeminent status simply
by supplying what broadcasters demand. By tailoring its ef-
forts to meet standards of blandness, the Council has achieved
its success as an influential PSA broker.
The perpetuation of standards catering to the safe, common
denominator impairs entry into the PSA marketplace by inter-
ests, such as consumers, environmentalists and civil rights
groups who could air potentially controversial messages. The
net result for viewers and listeners is a plethora of PSA's from
relatively non-diverse sources addressing non-controversial
subjects.
Even if a broadcaster wants to diversify his PSA sources,
though, he retains a compelling interest in avoiding divisive is-
sues. Non-controversial PSA's entail a minimal risk of fairness
obligations. Controversial PSA's, on the other hand, inevitably
18. Id.
19. Critics claim that an Advertising Council PSA campaign may cost from $50,000
to $300,000. PSA Petition, supra note 5, at 908.
20. Id.
21. Id.; Baldwin, supra note 17, at 37-38.
22. Airing of Public Service Announcements by Broadcast Licensees, 43 Fed. Reg.
37,725 (Aug. 24, 1978).
23. Baldwin, supra note 17, at 36.
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invite time requests to air balancing viewpoints. 4 To avert the
possibility of having to give away additional time for discus-
sion of a subject, and thus sacrifice profits, a broadcaster may
select those PSA's presenting the least threat to commercial
time and business fortunes.
This is the essence of the fairness doctrine barrier. Ironi-
cally, the doctrine may be the most potent restraint upon the
breadth and diversity of PSA's. When it was devised, the fair-
ness doctrine was supposed to provide for the interplay of
''representative community views and voices" in the electronic
forum.2 5 Although the FCC has considered strict adherence to
the fairness doctrine to be a broadcaster's most important
duty,2 the doctrine has not in fact helped broaden the spec-
trum of ideas in the electronic forum.
In actuality, the fairness doctrine has discouraged the airing
of many views and voices that might precipitate fairness obli-
gations. Broadcasters, in their general programming practices,
have always been motivated to avoid raising controversial is-
sues.27 Even paid advertisements face the prospect of rejec-
24. If a broadcaster airs a "controversial matter of public importance," the fairness
doctrine obligates him to provide an opportunity for presentation of an opposing view-
point. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7, 30 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1261 (1974); reconsid-
ered, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1021 (1976); rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. National Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978).
25. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 195 U.S. at 389.
26. Committee for the Fair Broadcasting of Controversial Issues, 25 F.C.C.2d 283,
292, 19 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1103 (1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. CBS v. FCC,
454 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
27. As a practical matter, the Court's reliance on the Fairness Doctrine
seriously overestimates the ability-or willingness--of broadcasters to expose
the public to the 'widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources.' . . . [I] n light of the strong interest of broadcasters
in maximizing their audience, and therefore their profits, it seems almost na-
ive to expect the majority of broadcasters to produce the variety and con-
troversiality of material necessary to reflect a full spectrum of viewpoints.
Stated simply, angry customers are not good customers and, in the commer-
cial world of mass communications, it is simply 'bad business' to espouse ...
the heterodox or the controversial. As a result, even under the Fairness Doc-
trine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only established--or at least mod-
erated-views to enter the broadcast world's 'marketplace of ideas.'
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (footnotes omitted).
Advertisers also may be reluctant to purchase time during controversial programs,
for fear that their products may be identified with an unpopular subject or cause.
Broadcasters, in turn, may tend to seek blander programming that will not frighten
away revenue sources. See Comment, Enforcing the Obligation to Present Controver-
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tion if considered too controversial.2 8 Furthermore, the FCC
has been reluctant to brandish its regulatory sword on behalf
of fairness, because of the First-Amendment-sensitive area
into which it would slice.2 9
Licensee fears that controversy may alienate viewers and ad-
vertisers, and a general FCC policy of deference to licensee
discretion on fairness matters, create an atmosphere that is by
no means conducive to extensive programming diversity. Any
effort to create a healthy PSA policy, therefore, must address
the fairness problems that afflict broadcasters and the Com-
mission. Such a policy either must require broadcasters to air
PSA's that run the risk of fairness obligations, or must en-
courage licensees to diversify their PSA's by exempting them
from fairness requirements.
II
A New PSA Policy
The FCC, in establishing a more effective PSA policy, might
best proceed with a combination of requirements and incen-
tives for PSA programming. A requirement that licensees air a
minimum number of PSA's each broadcast day probably
would be greeted with compliance.3 0 A layer of incentives,
atop the basic obligation to devote at least a certain amount of
programming time to PSA's, should be sufficient to generate
PSA's that serve the constitutional and public interest in diver-
sity.
sial Issues: The Forgotten Half of the Fairness Doctrine, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 137,
149 (1975); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Television Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 231-32.
28. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Company and Mobil Oil Company have at-
tempted to buy time for editorial advertisements but have encountered resistance
from broadcasters wary of potential fairness obligations. NEWSWEEK, July 2,1979, at 57.
29. The FCC, in making a fairness evaluation, considers whether a licensee acted
reasonably and in good faith. Fairness Report, supra note 24, at 17. That approach
reflects the Commission's conviction that it is not "appropriate for a governmental
agency to make" content-oriented decisions. Id. at 16. And it indicates "a desire to
avoid even the appearance of censorship." Comment, supra note 27, at 151-55.
30. The FCC has observed that if it created a minimum requirement for local news
and public affairs programming, most licensees would adopt that level as their mini-
mum standard. In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Appli-
cant, Stemming from the Competitive Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 427, 40 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P&F) 763 (1977), [hereinafter cited as Comparative Renewal Standards], affd




The foundation for a new PSA policy should rest upon a new
PSA definition. The present definition of PSA's, by specifically
naming government agencies and nonprofit organizations as
proper PSA sources,' conveys at least the appearance of an
implied preference for those institutions. Citizens' groups
have complained that they too are worthy PSA sources, but
that the prevailing definition of PSA's does not specifically
mention them and thus diminishes their acceptability to
broadcasters. Quite possibly, licensees who are hypersensitive
to regulatory expectations, and are inclined toward the safest
road to compliance, tend to rely upon government agencies
and nonprofit organizations for their PSA programming. Sub-
stantial dependence upon government and nonprofit organiza-
tions, however, seriously undermines the capacity of PSA's to
supply a broad spectrum of information needs.
So long as a definition satisfactorily explains to broadcasters
the nature of a PSA, it should be unnecessary to include exam-
ples of particular groups. A broader and less suggestive defini-
tion that would eliminate any possible implied preferences for
any groups or individuals might provide that:
A public service announcement is a non-routine, non-billable
broadcast message that:
(1) Informs the audience about a service, program or activ-
ity of community interest, or
(2) Provides a forum for individuals or groups to express
their ideas, viewpoints or opinions.
Time signals, routine weather announcements and station pro-
motional announcements are not public service announce-
ments.32
Such a definition would be more consistent with the spirit of
the policy "that no private individual or group has a right of
special access to the airways."3 3
Essential Ingredients
The FCC presently imposes no obligation upon licensees to
air even a minimum amount of PSA programming. It is un-
likely, however, that licensees would be burdened excessively
if required to devote, for instance, at least 90 seconds of air
31. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.112 n.4; 73.282 n.4; 73.582 n.3; 73.670 n.4.
32. Cf id.
33. PSA Petition, supra note 5, at 911.
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time every two hours to PSA's as part of their obligations to
serve the public interest.34
Such quantitative requirements would leave licensees with
full discretion to determine what types of PSA's would be
aired, when they would be aired, and how they would be aired.
A broadcaster who adhered to those standards would be con-
sidered "in compliance" with the requirement to air PSA's.
Moreover, those PSA's addressing a problem, need or interest
discovered through a licensee's ascertainment process, 35 would
be credited with programming responding to to ascertained
subjects. Failure to meet the minimum PSA obligation, how-
ever, would warrant any of the penalties which the Commis-
sion imposes for violating broadcasting regulations.3 1
In the past, the FCC has been reluctant to set percentage or
minimum quantitative standards for public affairs program-
ming. The Commission has refused to adopt regulations
designed to promote the frequency of such programming, be-
cause of its belief that substantial service to the community
would not necessarily result.37
For instance, the agency has suggested that a licensee might
fulfill percentage requirements for public affairs programming
by focusing upon such matters as canoe safety rather than
upon issues of deeper concern to the community.38 Such an
analysis presumes that licensees would fulfill their public af-
fairs obligation by ignoring what would be of interest to the
community-a programming strategy that would undercut the
broadcaster's economic self-interest in maximizing his audi-
ence and profits.
The Commission also has rejected quantitative standards as
34. A proposal that licensees be required to set aside 90 seconds of PSA time every
two hours was presented to, but rejected by, the FCC. The Commission concluded that
selection scheduling of PSA's fall within a licensee's broad discretion, and that it
should not intrude "into the sensitive area of programming." PSA Petition, supra note
5, at 910.
35. The ascertainment process is described in note 4, supra.
36. The FCC may issue cease-and-desist orders, revoke stations' licenses, deny li-
cense renewals, issue short-term renewals or impose monetary forfeitures. 47 U.S.C.
§§ 307(d), 312(b), 503(b) (1976).
37. Comparative Renewal Standards, supra note 30, 66 F.C.C.2d at 427: "[W]e con-
clude that quantitative standards would not do what we had hoped. They would not
simplify the hearing process, and they could not offer a licensee any real assurance of
renewal. They are a simplistic, superficial approach to a complex problem, and we will
not adopt them."




an encroachment upon licensee discretion "to broadcast the
programs they believe best serve their audiences." 3 9 However,
the agency has indicated it might implement standards if it
could be shown that "clear and substantial benefits" would re-
sult.40
A minimum PSA standard would only slightly disturb licen-
see discretion since small amounts of programming time would
be involved and important content decisions would be left to
the licensee's discretion. On balance, therefore, if more stimu-
lating PSA programming emerged from a relatively insignifi-
cant level of government regulation, clear and substantial
benefits could be realized.
A requirement to air a minimum number of PSA's would es-
tablish only a base level public interest standard. However,
licensees would have clear notice of the minimum PSA per-
formance required by the Commission and of their relative
standings in serving one aspect of the public interest. No in-
cursions would have to be made into licensee discretion to de-
termine PSA content. Furthermore, any fear broadcasters
might have over possible audience loss would be unwarranted,
given the brief amount of time PSA's require.
Even if some broadcasters concentrated upon PSA quantity,
rather than quality and relevance, FCC policy could encourage
them to draw upon more diverse and representative views and
voices in their community. An appropriate set of incentives,
therefore, could assure that public service form did not tri-
umph over public service substance.
III
Incentives
Broadcasters' First Amendment rights, although subordinate
to those of the public," would be unnecessarily hampered if
the Commission were to establish content standards for PSA's.
Incentives designed to broaden the PSA spectrum, however,
would be an equitable alternative that served the interests of
diversity without pitting one set of First Amendment values
against another.
The FCC is in a position to offer substantial and effective in-
39. Comparative Renewal Standards, supra note 30, 66 F.C.C.2d at 427.
40. Id.
41. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 390.
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ducements to encourage PSA's that furnish the community
with more representative views and voices.
The Commission could add PSA's to its list of programming
categories that help establish "superior" service for renewal
purposes in a comparative proceeding.4 2 News, public affairs
and local programming are the existing programming catego-
ries that provide a basis for a "superior" service finding. Such
a rating affords an established licensee one advantage, in a
comparative proceeding, over competing applicants for a
broadcast frequency.
A licensee also could present evidence of his PSA program-
ming and performance to establish "meritorious program-
ming."4 3  Such a "meritorious" finding can be helpful in
offsetting the consequences of any mistakes or misconduct by
a broadcaster during his license term, and conceivably could
rescue his license at renewal time.'
Broadcasters who implemented a PSA policy providing di-
rect and equal opportunity access for individuals and groups
might be exempted from fairness obligations that otherwise
would attach to such messages.45
42. "'Superior' or above average past performance" has been held to be "highly
relevant" in a comparative proceeding "and might be expected to prevail absent some
clear and strong showing by the challenger." Central Fla. Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d
37, 57 (1978).
A comparative proceeding results when the Commission receives more than one ap-
plication for the same frequency and must evaluate the qualifications of each applicant
to determine who should receive a license to broadcast.
43. A general finding of "meritorious programming" may serve to counterbalance
licensee misconduct or rule violations that otherwise jeopardize a broadcast license.
Norjud Broadcasting, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 808,35 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 173 (1975); Rust Com-
munications Group, Inc., 544 F.C.C.2d 419 (1975); Oil Shale Broadcasting Co., 52
F.C.C.2d 1167,33 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1227 (1975); Friendly Broadcasting Co., 35 F.C.C.2d
611, 24 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 712 (1972).
44. "A significant amount of meritorious programming" has helped a broadcaster
retain his license despite a showing that he or his subordinates had falsified news,
conducted a lottery, failed to exercise adequate supervision over his employees and
lacked due care in corresponding with the Commission. The FCC used "meritorious
programming" as a justification for a short-term renewal. Action Radio, Inc., 51
F.C.C.2d 803, 33 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 51 (1975).
45. Special immunity for licensees in special circumstances has been recognized
as a valid means of promoting political debate and diversity of expression in broad-
casting. The Supreme Court, for instance, has held that a licensee is not liable for
defamatory remarks made by a political candidate whose statements were aired under
section 315. The Court concluded that the absence of such an exemption would "ham-
per the congressional plan to develop broadcasting as a political outlet, rather than to
foster it." Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535
(1959).
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The Commission could also offer special rewards to licensees
who air PSA's responding to ascertained problems, needs and
interests. For instance, PSA programming directed toward as-
certained issues could receive ascertainment programming
credit at a multiple of the actual PSA time devoted to a subject.
A 30 or 60 second PSA quite often would reach substantially
more viewers or listeners than a 30 or 60 minute public affairs
program. Credit based on the actual length of such PSA pro-
gramming might undervalue the impact of such a PSA and,
therefore, extra credit would be justified. Similarly, a multiple
credit scheme for PSA's aired during peak audience hours
would encourage the use of PSA's at those times.
Formulas like these would encourage more extensive and di-
verse PSA programming without any element of regulatory co-
ercion. Licensees who respond positively to the FCC's
incentives could furnish more representative views and voices
in two different ways-either by presenting issues and con-
cerns of their own choosing or by opening their studio doors
and microphones to community members. Viewpoint diversity
would result from either alternative and, therefore, ascertain-
ment or access-based PSA's would be a worthy ingredient in
the Commission's recipe for "superior" and "meritorious" pro-
gramming.
Ascertainment-based PSA 's
A broadcaster whose PSA performance served the needs and
interests of the community as ascertained by him, should be
able to offer such evidence to support a claim of "superior" or
"meritorious" programming.
However, the incentives of "superior" and "meritorious" pro-
gramming credit along might not assure that ascertainment-
based PSA's are aired at meaningful times. "Superior" and
"meritorious" designations, therefore, could be withheld if a
preponderant and unreasonable number of a station's PSA's
were aired between the hours of 11 p.m. and 6 a.m." If PSA
46. A "superior" and "meritorious" determination would require evaluation of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the licensee's PSA programming. If, for instance,
the broadcaster aired the majority of his PSA's between 11 and 6 but still broadcast a
significant number during other hours, a finding of "superior" and "meritorious" pro-
gramming would not be precluded. Otherwise, a licensee who aired PSA's throughout




policy is supposed to increase the frequency and broaden the
content of PSA programming, but the public is asleep when the
message is aired, it would be incongruous to attach "superior"
and "meritorious" labels to such efforts.
A promise of multiple credit for each PSA aired during peak
audience hours, however, might provide sufficient inducement
to rescue PSA's from the late-night or early-morning grave-
yards.
Access-based PSA 's
Licensees who allow community groups and individuals to
deliver their own PSA's should also be entitled to offer their
formats as evidence of "superior" and "meritorious" program-
ming.
A necessary corollary is that those opening their studio
doors for public access also should be permitted to exempt
their PSA's from the fairness doctrine requirements. This im-
munity would substantially neutralize one of the greatest ob-
stacles to PSA diversity. Since licensees would be free from
concern over obligations to grant time for response to view-
points expressed in PSA's, they could afford to be less appre-
hensive about and less restrictive of PSA content.
Any provision for access-based PSA's should assure that
speakers and viewpoints are not excluded arbitrarily or acci-
dentally. Administrative sensitivity would be essential in
structuring an access system for a forum where the number of
speakers would probably always exceed the available number
of time slots. Moreover, safeguards would be necessary to pro-
tect against efforts to dominate or monopolize the PSA market-
place.
A possible scheme for establishing an access system, with
maximum equal opportunity for all views and voices, would be
to make air time available either on a basis of random selection
or through a system of representative spokespersons. Combin-
ing these methods is also a possibility.
Licensees, for instance, could set aside PSA time for groups
or individuals selected from a lottery, or on a first-come, first-
served basis. Time also could be allocated for representative
spokespersons who wished to address community issues or
390 [Vol. 2
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problems.4 7 A qualification for spokespersons simply might be
the ability to collect enough signatures on a petition to be con-
sidered a voice for others in the community.
Creation of a PSA access system would offer more represen-
tative views by providing more representative voices. Legal
and administrative barriers, however, still impede this evolu-
tion.
Although the Supreme Court has denied the existence of a
public right of paid access to radio or television, it has forged a
path for the FCC to "devise some kind of limited right of access
that is both practicable and desirable."4 Broadcasters have al-
ready demonstrated that PSA's are practicable, and the inter-
est in information and viewpoints from the widest array of
sources underscores their desirability.
The FCC itself has established a four-part test which any ac-
cess system must pass before it can be considered acceptable.
Access PSA's would measure up well to the Commission's re-
quirements, which include:
(1) Assurance that important issues do not escape timely dis-
cussion;
(2) Preservation of licensee discretion;
(3) Protection against any right of access accruing to particu-
lar persons and groups;
(4) Making sure government is not drawn into the role of de-
ciding who receives air time and when.49
A pool of speakers from a community should supply enough
individuals who are ready and willing to offer their own indi-
vidual, as well as representative, viewpoints on important con-
temporary issues.50
Although the Commission has expressed reluctance to inter-
fere with licensee discretion in programming, the agency al-
ready intrudes into the realm of program content under the
fairness doctrine." Moreover, licensee discretion would not be
47. See Comments of Committee for Open Media, BC Docket No. 78-60 (FCC, filed
Sept. 6, 1978).
48. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 132 (1973).
49. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 699, 36 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 1021 (1976), rev'd in part sub nom. National Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
50. A two and one-half year experiment with "free speech messages" in San Fran-
cisco produced an abundance of speakers and an abundance of viewpoints. Access is
Fairness: A Petition for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the Fairness Report
(FCC, filed Aug. 12, 1974).
51. An FCC order for a broadcaster to balance his programming in the cause of
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eroded by a PSA access option, since a broadcaster could still
choose whether to air PSA's that (1) merely met minimum
quantitative standards, (2) responded to ascertained problems,
needs and interests, or (3) provided access to community
groups and individuals. The decision to furnish access in itself,
therefore, would be a manifestation and product of licensee
discretion.
Access-based PSA's would also be instrumental in ex-
panding PSA sources and in safeguarding against an unreason-
ably circumscribed content range. A system that relied upon
many speakers, drawn from the full spectrum of the commu-
nity, rather than upon the determinations of a lone licensee,
inevitably would invite and produce more diverse viewpoints
and information.
Finally, PSA access would reduce and reshape the gover-
ment's role as an editorial decision-maker. The FCC's content-
oriented responsibilities for access spots would consist of de-
termining whether such messages fit the definition of a PSA,
rather than whether they create a need for balance. Commis-
sion oversight, therefore, would be scaled down from subjec-
tive evaluations of fairness to observations of rudimentary
fitness.
Special Interests
The programming of ascertainment and access-based PSA's
would knock down a major barrier for many voices now seek-
ing entry into the electronic forum. Although such PSA's
would create more and better opportunities for a broader range
of interests, it is possible that some special interests still would
be deprived of a hearing.
Since broadcasting markets vary significantly in their audi-
ence composition, it is difficult to generalize about who would
constitute one of those "special interests." Possible examples,
however, might include persons underrepresented because of
handicaps, language or age. Since the handicapped, the eld-
erly and children, at least, are probably present in all markets,
the FCC might consider failure to direct a reasonable amount
of PSA time to these groups as a possible ground for denying a
finding of "superior" or "meritorious" programming.
fairness explicitly lifts content control from the licensee's hands. See Bazelon, FCC
Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 235.
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A "reasonable amount," however, might vary with the com-
munity and circumstances. Furthermore, it could prove diffi-
cult and inadvisable to set uniform standards for the amount of
time to be considered reasonable.
A workable formula for setting standards, though, might be-
gin by requiring licensees to seek out and serve those special
interests within their particular markets. The "seeking out"
part of the mandate could be formalized into a requirement to
ascertain those groups which, because of age, language, handi-
cap, or some other disability, would be underrepresented in
the electronic forum. The "service" facet of the requirement
would consist of providing those interests with a reasonable
amount of PSA programming.
The amount of PSA time devoted to this purpose could be
subject to challenge as unreasonable. A standard for an unrea-
sonable amount of PSA time eludes definition. But a showing
of non-existent or sporadic PSA programming, or other con-
vincing evidence of neglect, should be sufficient to establish a
finding of unreasonableness and lead toward a conclusion that
the licensee's programming efforts were neither "superior" nor
"'meritorious."
Absent any challenge to a licensee's performance, however,
the Commission could settle for a simple showing by the
broadcaster that he made a good-faith endeavor to serve spe-
cial interests in his community through PSA programming.
Even such a seemingly lax standard would still subject to com-
munity scrutiny and potential attack the licensee's efforts on
behalf of special interests. Compliance thus would depend
heavily upon licensee self-interest in procuring favorable pro-
gramming evaluations from the FCC.
Conclusion
The potential contribution of PSA's to the public dialogue
may be overlooked or underestimated because of their fleeting
nature. Although PSA's do not offer extensive discussion of is-
sues, they do provide a means for capturing and holding audi-
ence attention. Consequently, the value of PSA's may be their
unique capacity to stimulate a viewer or listener to reflect upon
an idea or an issue that otherwise might not be considered.
PSA programming would not alter a licensee's already ex-
isting obligation to cover public issues, but would rather serve
1979] 393
394 COMM/ENT [Vol. 2
as a valuable complement to other types of public interest pro-
gramming.
Broadcasting for now exists in a regulated environment that
supposedly exalts the rights of the viewing and listening pub-
lic. So long as this attitude continues to exist, the FCC should
be protective and supportive of those rights. The prevailing
combination of PSA policy and programming, though, has con-
tributed little to the public's interest in diversity in the media
marketplace.
An FCC policy requiring a minimum amount of PSA pro-
gramming and encouraging community orientation or input
should precipitate more PSA programming that represents
more views and voices. Such developments should yield more
public service programming and, consequently, more program-
ming in the public interest.
